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A B S T R A C T
Background: A fundamental debate in the transition towards univer-
sal health coverage concerns whether to establish an explicit health
beneﬁts package to which all citizens are entitled, and the level of
detail in which to specify that package. At one extreme, the treat-
ments to be funded, and the circumstances in which patients qualify
for the treatment, might be speciﬁed in great detail, and be entirely
mandatory. This would make clinicians little more than automata,
carrying out prescribed practice. At the other extreme, priorities may
be expressed in very broad terms, with no compulsion or other
incentives to encourage adherence. Objectives: The paper examines
the arguments for and against setting an explicit beneﬁts package,
and discusses the circumstances in which increased detail in speci-
ﬁcation are most appropriate. Methods: The English National Health
Service is used as a case study, based on institutional history, ofﬁcial
documents and research literature. Results: Although the English
NHS does not explicitly specify a health beneﬁts package, it is in
some respects establishing an ‘intelligent’ package, based on
instruments such as an essential medicines list, clinical guidelines,
provider payment and performance reporting, which acknowledges
gaps in evidence and variations in local resource constraints. Con-
clusions: Further moves towards a more explicit speciﬁcation are
likely to yield substantial beneﬁts in most health systems. Consid-
erations in determining the ‘hardness’ of beneﬁts package speciﬁca-
tion might include the quality of information about the costs and
beneﬁts of treatments, the heterogeneity of patient needs and pref-
erences, the ﬁnancing regime in place, and the nature of supply side
constraints.
Keywords: cost-effectiveness analysis, health beneﬁts package,
universal health coverage.
Copyright & 2017, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
The World Health Organization identiﬁes three dimensions of
policymaking choices as countries seek to implement universal
health coverage (UHC): the groups in the population to be covered,
the level of ﬁnancial protection offered when seeking access to
services, and the range of services to be covered. Of these, the ﬁrst
two dimensions frequently offer little realistic scope for policy
variation. Allowing access only to certain population subgroups
contradicts the fundamental intent of universality. And imposing
any level of user charges may exclude access for the poorest groups,
as well as entail administrative complexity. Therefore, the central
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focus of policy will usually be the third dimension of the UHC
design: the range of services to be made available, usually referred
to as the health beneﬁts package (HBP).
Many high-income countries have sought to maintain pack-
ages that are quite comprehensive, in the sense that most
clinically accepted interventions have been included [1]. In con-
trast, low- and middle-income countries with slender resources
have been forced to confront the issue of which interventions or
services to include in their beneﬁts package [2]. Sometimes, as,
for example, in the case of Chile [3] or Mexico [4], this problem
has been addressed directly, and a carefully circumscribed pack-
age has been explicitly deﬁned. More often, however, the package
has been developed piecemeal and implicitly, as, for example, in
India [5].
Numerous techniques and processes have been adopted for
selecting the beneﬁts package [6]. Nevertheless, whatever the
resources available, policymakers will usually wish to max-
imize the effectiveness of their UHC policy, in the form of
maximizing the “value” (however deﬁned) of the health serv-
ices purchased with the limited publicly funded budget. Econ-
omists have advocated the use of cost-effectiveness analysis
(CEA) as making this principle operational, on the assumption
that the objective to be maximized is health gain. Although the
application of the cost-effectiveness criterion suffers from
some theoretical limitations, it has enjoyed widespread accept-
ance as a reasonable principle for prioritizing the use of scarce
health service resources [7].
CEA should therefore be an important tool for determining
which health services to fund as countries seek to implement
UHC. Nevertheless, implementation of the cost-effectiveness
criterion for setting the HBP is seriously hampered by major
practical limitations, such as the following:
1. Lack of adequate data for many, if not most, interventions;
2. System constraints that preclude immediate changes in serv-
ice delivery;
3. Political constraints that circumscribe many choices; and
4. Lack of adequate capacity for assembling and synthesizing
relevant analytic material [8].
As a result, most beneﬁts packages have been developed in an
ad-hoc fashion, sometimes shaped by CEA, but often tempered by
practicality and inertia.
The English National Health Service (NHS) is an archetypal
central planning approach toward UHC. Furthermore, it has
established a renowned agency for assessing new and existing
treatments, in the form of the National Institute for Health and
Care Excellence (NICE). Yet, notwithstanding the apparent
clarity of the NICE terms of reference and the technical
resources at its disposal, it has focused mainly on the evalua-
tion of new technologies, and it can be argued that NICE has
had only a modest impact on the total range of services actually
made available to NHS patients. The English approach toward
setting the beneﬁts package is therefore of particular interest as
a basis for discussing the tensions and constraints that arise
when seeking to determine what health treatments are to be
made available [9].
This article examines the extent to which the English NHS has
an explicit HBP. It ﬁrst sets out the arguments for and against
such explicitness. It then speciﬁcally examines the role of CEA in
guiding the creation of the package. A short outline of the English
health system then follows, with an assessment of the extent to
which that system yields an explicit statement of entitlements.
The article then concludes with some general observations on
setting the HBP.
Arguments for and against Setting an Explicit HBP
As documented by Glassman et al. [10], there are numerous well-
rehearsed arguments in favor of setting an explicit HBP to which
all beneﬁciaries are entitled:
1. It creates explicit entitlements for patients, whose access to
services might otherwise be largely determined by clinical
professionals, with the consequent potential for arbitrary
variations in access.
2. It helps to identify whether funds are being spent wisely on
services that create the maximum beneﬁt for the society.
3. By specifying the services to be delivered, it facilitates impor-
tant resource allocation decisions, such as regional funding
allocations, and other planning functions, creating a precon-
dition for reducing variations in care and outcomes.
4. It facilitates orderly adherence to budget limits, which might
otherwise be attained only through arbitrary restrictions on
access and services.
5. It reduces the risk that providers will require informal payments
from patients to secure access to high-value services.
6. The entitlements created empower poor and marginalized
groups, who cannot be made aware of any speciﬁc entitlement
without an explicit HBP.
7. It creates the preconditions for a market in complementary
health insurance for services not covered, with a number of
potential beneﬁts for the health system as a whole.
It is important to distinguish between explicitness in stating
the contents of the beneﬁts package and consistency and rigor in
selecting the contents. It is quite conceivable that a package may
be made explicit, but the process for selecting the contents is
opaque and inconsistent. Some of the aforementioned virtues of
an explicit package arise whatever may be the selection process.
Nevertheless, most can have full effect only if the package is
selected using consistent application of an explicit set of criteria.
Notwithstanding the powerful reasons for developing an
explicit beneﬁts package, and basing it on consistent stated
criteria, there are also reasons for caution in pursuing an
explicitly delineated package:
1. There are very signiﬁcant practical difﬁculties of specifying a
package in enough detail to have an impact on clinicians.
Although it may be feasible to make broad statements
regarding the services to be delivered, it may be impractical
to specify the circumstances in which speciﬁc treatments may
be funded. This may be because of a lack of suitable evidence
and analytic capacity, a lack of adequate information systems
or funding mechanisms, or a lack of detailed clinical guide-
lines on what constitutes best care.
2. A closely deﬁned package may inhibit innovation, especially if it
is based on treatments to be delivered rather than on disease
categories. If the package is not constantly reviewed and
updated, there is a risk that it will reﬂect outdated approaches
to care, and ignore new, more efﬁcient treatments or modes of
delivering care, and inhibit take-up of those new approaches.
3. In the same vein, the package may inhibit warranted variations
in treatment that reﬂect patients’ circumstances or preferences.
The contents of any package will be based on broad average
responses to treatment in the population at risk. Although it is
important that all treatments should be cost-effective, there
will often be circumstances in which clinical judgment
may suggest departures from usual treatment for speciﬁc
patients that improve cost-effectiveness. In principle, any
package should be ﬂexible enough to accommodate such
departures.
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4. Explicit statements of patient entitlement may create
serious political and legal difﬁculties for health ministries, by
appearing to favor certain groups at the expense of others,
and giving rise to a sense that some health care is being
“rationed.” Of course, the prime reason for the limitations to
care is created by the limited budget made available, but that
may not be the focus of political debate. In such circum-
stances, however, a ministry may be prepared to sacriﬁce
improved efﬁciency by retaining some ambiguity about the
nature of the package.
5. There may be existing rigidities in health system that preclude
moving toward a new package of care. The transition may
require investment costs in new infrastructure and training,
may cause disruption to the care of existing patients, may
entail disinvestment from some services, and may require
political and clinical leadership. Furthermore, there may be an
asymmetry between the willingness to pay for new programs
compared with established programs [11]. Such concerns are
particularly important when the innovation has a substantial
budgetary impact [12]. They are common to most health
system reforms and require careful planning to ensure a
smooth transition over time toward the new arrangements.
6. A beneﬁts package may create an uncertain ﬁnancial liability for
the health system. By creating entitlements to care, it
becomes impossible to limit access through waiting times,
user fees, or other informal means. Although this is of course
the intention behind creating the package, it may mean that
the impact on the UHC budget is uncertain, and if not under-
pinned by good analysis, the sustainability of the UHC
program may be compromised.
In considering these arguments, it is important to distinguish
between services that are promised (stated perhaps as entitle-
ments) and services that are actually received by patients. The
performance of any health system should be assessed with
respect to the scope and quality of services actually received by
patients. The speciﬁcation of a beneﬁts package is merely an
instrument for specifying desired levels of attainment, which
may or may not be translated into services received. The
effectiveness with which an explicit beneﬁts package leads to
the right services being delivered to the right patients at the right
time with a high level of quality should be the performance
measure for an HBP.
The Role of CEA
The principle of CEA is that, subject to a number of important
assumptions, health care interventions can be ranked on the
basis of their incremental costs relative to their incremental
beneﬁts. This characterization is a severe simpliﬁcation because
it makes a number of assumptions, such as independence of the
various treatments under consideration and constant returns to
scale. Relaxing these assumptions does not preclude the use of
CEA, but does give rise to methodological complexity that is not
germane to this article. Beneﬁts are usually measured in terms of
expected health gain, although alternative formulations can be
envisaged. This leads to a policy prescription of including treat-
ments in the HBP in order of increasing cost-effectiveness, until
the available budget is exhausted. An equivalent formulation is
to accept for inclusion only those interventions that lie below
some cost-effectiveness threshold, the value of which depends
on the size of the budget available. Although CEA can be applied
to the choices of individuals in a private health insurance market,
its usual application is to collectively funded insurance systems,
of the sort used to promote universal health coverage [7]. The
CEA principle seeks to maximize “value” (expressed in the form
of expected health gain) secured by the budget. The “marginal”
treatment just included in the package determines the system’s
cost-effectiveness threshold [13].
This simple theory has proved robust to methodological
challenge, and forms the basis of a great deal of health technol-
ogy assessments undertaken around the world. Although there
are alternative formulations, it has proved difﬁcult to challenge
the principle of seeking to maximize the social value secured
from the limited budget available. The CEA threshold offers a
consistent benchmark for assessing the competing claims of
patients on a limited budget, and applies a widely accepted
principle of fairness—that those who can beneﬁt the most from
health service spending should have priority. A particularly
common challenge to the CEA rule has been the suggestion that
it should reﬂect different levels of priority for health gain for
different social groups (perhaps weighting gains for disadvan-
taged groups more highly than others). This modiﬁcation is
potentially important for the groups affected, and creates con-
siderable analytic complexity, but it does not materially affect the
principles underlying CEA [14].
The use of CEA has predominantly been in the ﬁeld of health
technology assessment, for setting broad priorities on which
treatments should in general be included in the HBP. In doing
so, the usual practice is to base CEA on expected average
responses to the treatment under scrutiny in the population
expected to receive the treatment. Yet if the principle of CEA is
accepted, it should in theory extend to every treatment decision
made in the health system. That is, every treatment choice
offered to patients should be such that the expected cost-
effectiveness ratio lies below the health system threshold. The
treatment can be offered only when the costs of treatment for that
speciﬁc patient are compared with the expected health gain for
that patient [15]. The heterogeneity of patients means that, for
many treatments, there may be substantial variation from the
average cost-effectiveness ratio. In principle, the treatment
should be offered only to those patients for whom that ratio is
expected to be less than the threshold [16]. If this rule is
breached, the resources spent on the high-cost (or low-beneﬁt)
patients could be better spent somewhere else in the health
system. In practice, there has been little use of appropriateness
criteria in CEA. Once a treatment is accepted in a beneﬁts
package, it is usually the case that all patients are entitled to
the treatment, even those for whom the potential health gain is
low relative to the cost of treatment.
An important reason for failing to apply cost-effectiveness
criteria to individual treatment decisions relates to practicality.
Many CEA models are based on limited information, and the
disaggregate evidence necessary to determine which subgroups
should receive the treatment is often absent or inadequate.
Moreover, it is difﬁcult to envisage how clinicians could practi-
cally discriminate between patients unless they have solid
evidence with which to justify their decision. Their training and
professional outlook require a focus on the beneﬁts and costs of
treatment for individual patients rather than a broader societal
perspective. Cost-effectiveness criteria could, in principle, be built
into clinical guidelines, specifying the conditions under which
speciﬁed treatments satisfy the criteria for acceptance. Never-
theless, in practice it has proved difﬁcult to incorporate detailed
economic criteria into clinical guidelines. It is also important to
note the ethical and political difﬁculties of discriminating
between patient types when making a treatment available [17].
For example, age may often be an important predictor of health
beneﬁts from treatment, and so might in principle be included in
guidance. Nevertheless, precluding some patients from access to
treatment on the grounds of age could be interpreted as discrim-
inatory under equality laws. Such considerations reﬂect a sort of
equity constraint.
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Indeed, in contrast to the highly detailed speciﬁcations
suggested in the preceding paragraphs, it is often the case that
the HBP is set in very broad terms, such as requiring provision
of “all necessary hospital treatment free of charge” as in
Denmark [18]. This may occur when limitations of data, gover-
nance, or policy capacity preclude a more reﬁned speciﬁcation
of priorities. In the extreme, priority setting might take the form
of ﬁnancing certain classes of providers (such as public sector
hospitals), without reference to the speciﬁc treatments they are
expected to provide. This was historically the approach toward
public sector provision of services in many lower-income
countries [19]. The risk of adopting such a broad deﬁnition of
priorities is that the prioritized providers may provide some
services that are not cost-effective (or conversely the non-
prioritized sectors may fail to provide services that are cost-
effective). Furthermore, because of the funding model, treat-
ments may be provided in inappropriate settings and quality of
care may be poor. These failures of efﬁciency and effectiveness
represent an opportunity cost of lacking the capacity to adopt
more detailed prioritization.
One ﬁnal limitation that applies to any priority-setting proc-
ess, of whatever sort, relates to the issue of enforcement. There is
widespread evidence that stated priorities, whether based on CEA
or otherwise, are ignored by many health service providers [20].
This may be because priorities are merely advisory and can be
ignored with impunity, or because other policy instruments—
such as ﬁnancing mechanisms or regulations—are not aligned
with priorities, or because providers are unaware of these prior-
ities. Furthermore, it may be the case that system constraints
preclude implementation, or make its costs substantially higher
than those assumed when formulating the priorities [21]. In
particular, CEA usually considers only long-run average costs,
and not the immediate costs of implementation, which may, for
example, include retraining of personnel. To some extent, the
freedom of providers to depart from a stated health basket may
be desirable if they are responding to patient heterogeneity, as
discussed earlier. However, the departures may lead to inefﬁ-
ciency if they are unwarranted by patient characteristics, and the
consequent treatment is not cost-effective.
It has therefore in practice proved difﬁcult for health systems
to apply the principle of cost-effectiveness consistently, compre-
hensively, or effectively to its insurance coverage decisions.
Departures from stated priorities may be warranted when uncer-
tainty is high or evidence lacking. Departures, however, may also
result in inefﬁcient use of health system funding if they lead to
provision of services that are not cost-effective.
NICE and the English NHS
The Institutional Framework
The English NHS is an archetypal centrally planned health
system. It is funded overwhelmingly by national taxation, as part
of the health ministry’s annual budget. Since its establishment in
1948, the NHS has been subject to numerous structural reforms
that have left its basic structure intact. For the purpose of this
discussion, the key elements are as follows:
1. A central role for the national ministry in setting policy,
monitoring performance, and allocating funding to geograph-
ical localities; some of these activities have recently been
transferred to a national agency, NHS England, which is
responsible for day-to-day operations of the NHS.
2. The NHS Constitution, which sets out a quasi-legal set of
rights and responsibilities for citizens concerning access to
the NHS.
3. Local health authorities in receipt of an annual budget and
responsible for organizing and purchasing the NHS in their
locality, a function known as “commissioning”; at present
these authorities are called clinical commissioning groups
(CCGs) and each is responsible for a population of about
250,000 people.
4. General practitioners (GPs), who are primary care physicians
organized into practices serving on average about 8000 people;
GPs play an important gatekeeping role. All citizens must
register with a GP, and no one can secure access to non-
emergency secondary care without a referral by a GP.
5. User charges are either absent or very low.
By international standards, the NHS as a system has low
levels of spending, offers high levels of protection from the
ﬁnancial consequences of ill health, and enjoys high levels of
popularity among its citizens [22]. In some clinical areas, how-
ever, it secures only moderate quality outcomes for its popula-
tion, relative to other high-income countries. For example,
improvements in 5-year cancer survival rates lag behind those
found in many other developed countries [23].
NICE and the Role of CEA
NICE, which was established in 1999, is an important element of
the English NHS. Its role is to provide national guidance and
advice to improve health and social care, as summarized in
Table 1.
The establishment of NICE, and the high public proﬁle it
enjoys, is a strong signal that the principles of cost-effectiveness
are accepted as an important criterion for the inclusion of health
treatments in the English HBP. Although NICE emphasizes that it
is not the only relevant criterion, econometric analysis conﬁrms
that cost-effectiveness dominates other quantiﬁable considera-
tions when determining its health technology appraisal decisions
[24]. It is noteworthy that policymakers found it necessary to
Table 1 – Types of NICE guidance [40].
NICE guidance takes several forms:
NICE guidelines make evidence-based recommendations on a wide
range of topics, from preventing and managing speciﬁc condi-
tions, improving health and managing medicines in different
settings, to providing social care to adults and children, and
planning broader services and interventions to improve the
health of communities. These aim to promote integrated care
where appropriate, for example, by covering transitions between
children’s and adult services and between health and social care.
Technology appraisals assess the clinical and cost-effectiveness of
health technologies, such as new pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical products, but also include procedures, devices,
and diagnostic agents. This is to ensure that all NHS patients
have equitable access to the most clinically and cost-effective
treatments that are viable.
Medical technologies and diagnostics guidance help to ensure that the
NHS is able to adopt clinically and cost-effective technologies
rapidly and consistently.
Interventional procedures guidance recommends whether interven-
tional procedures, such as laser treatments for eye problems or
deep brain stimulation for chronic pain, are effective and safe
enough for use in the NHS.
NHS, National Health Service; NICE, National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence.
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create a “cancer drugs fund” to include high-cost cancer drugs
that would not normally have secured approval from NICE on
cost-effectiveness grounds [25]. The implication is that certain
patients with cancer warranted privileged access to NHS treat-
ments for reasons that go beyond the conventions of routine NICE
appraisals [26]. In the same vein, the cost-effectiveness criterion
has been relaxed for certain “end-of-life” treatments [27].
One aspect of the NICE guidance on technology appraisals is
supported by statute. If NICE produces guidance on a technology
appraisal to say that a new medicine should be made available to
NHS patients who meet particular criteria, then the local health
organizations that are responsible for providing funding for that
treatment are under a statutory obligation to ensure that the
technology “is, from a date not later than three months from the
date of that Technology Appraisal Guidance, normally available”
[28]. This process forms the basis for what is in effect an English
“essential medicines list.”
As discussed by Mason [29], legislation deﬁnes broad catego-
ries of health care service that can be provided by the NHS. The
statutes, however, are framed within a vague deﬁnition of health
need characterized by a “reasonable requirement” and by the
right to take into account NHS ﬁnancial capacity. In practice, this
means that patients have no entitlement to speciﬁc services. The
NHS Constitution [30] sets out a patient’s rights including “the
right to receive care and treatment that is appropriate to you,
meets your needs and reﬂects your preferences.” Although
certain principles and quality criteria are set out, it includes
few explicit treatment entitlements, other than drugs approved
by NICE and national vaccination and screening programs. It
states that “you have the right to expect local decisions on
funding of other drugs and treatments to be made rationally
following a proper consideration of the evidence. If the local NHS
decides not to fund a drug or treatment you and your doctor feel
would be right for you, they will explain that decision to you.”
NICE has tried over the years to develop a library of quality
indicators, drawn at large from its own clinical guidelines,
technology appraisals, and, more recently, public health guid-
ance. The intention is for these to inform pay-for-performance
schemes for primary and secondary care providers and commis-
sioners and also for regulation purposes. The use of such
regulatory, contractual, and payment mechanisms suggests that
the NHS is attempting more clearly to specify services, as
opposed to a negative or positive list of medical technologies.
For example, the 2012 Health and Social Care Act explicitly
requires the Secretary of State to take account of NICE quality
standards when discharging his or her duty to improve care
quality across the NHS. Reference to “aspirational but achievable”
statements of good quality care, increasingly linked to measures
of performance for the NHS such as its Outcomes Framework,
may represent a move toward more explicit speciﬁcation of what
the NHS in England seeks to offer its users [31].
Local Management and Decision Making
The management of the NHS depends heavily on about 200 local
“commissioners” of care, each of which covers a geographically
deﬁned population of about 250,000 people. These CCGs are given
ﬁxed budgets with which to purchase routine local services and
drugs, and have a strong managerial focus on adherence to those
budgets as well as quality of care. The NHS has for many decades
used a sophisticated set of formulae to allocate funds to CCGs (and
their predecessor organizations), with the intention of securing
equal access to services for equal clinical need [32]. In principle, the
budget allocated to localities should reﬂect the costs of providing a
stated HBP. In practice, because no such HBP exists, the funding
formula is conservative, reﬂecting expected expenditure on average
across England, given the locality’s demographic, health, social, and
economic circumstances. A major policy concern is therefore the
extent to which the present formulae (which are based on an
empirical analysis of previous spending patterns) reﬂect “unmet”
medical needs that the NHS has historically failed to satisfy. Of
course, by the same token, the empirical analysis may also reﬂect
some aspects of unwarranted expenditure, in the form of inefﬁcient
care or inappropriate treatments.
Although CCGs are subject to many performance criteria,
including attainment under the NHS Outcomes Framework, their
overriding imperative (and statutory duty) is to “ensure expenditure
in a ﬁnancial year does not exceed the allocated budget” [33].
Therefore, if clinical needs exceed those assumed in the budget (or
if there is local inefﬁciency), there will often be strong pressure on
the CCGs to limit access to certain treatments, a freedom they can
to some extent exercise under the statutory framework for the NHS.
Note also that, depending on existing operational constraints, the
local opportunity costs of providing treatments may differ substan-
tially from the national averages assumed by NICE and other
central agencies, at least in the short run. Moreover, many commis-
sioners have put in place “exceptional case” panels to consider
requests for treatments not usually available to NHS patients [34].
The local discretion on funding decisions has led to a phenomenon
known as the NHS “postcode lottery,” a term adopted by the media
and politicians when referring to different decisions made by local
health care commissioners on whether or not to fund speciﬁc
health treatments. Examples include variations in drugs made
available (even when approved by NICE) [20] and variations in
clinical treatment thresholds for treatments such as hip replace-
ment and cataract surgery [35].
There is considerable evidence that clinical variation is wide-
spread, as documented in some detail in the NHS Atlas of Variation
in Healthcare [36]. Some of these clinical variations can be
attributed to differences in local policies. Nevertheless, there also
appears to be considerable variation in professional practice [36].
For example, the Atlas shows a twofold variation in the use of
colonoscopy and ﬂexisigmoidoscopy procedures, after adjust-
ment for age and sex—such clinical variations are quite typical.
In some disease areas, efforts have been made to address this
through the promulgation of “National Service Frameworks” and
other clinical guidelines. These, however, are advisory and have
variable levels of effectiveness. Furthermore, as discussed earlier,
there will sometimes be good reasons for variation from standard
practice. Nevertheless, it remains the case that there is likely to
be considerable unwarranted, and therefore inefﬁcient, variation
in clinical practice in the NHS, even after allowing for natural
variability in demand for services [36].
Thus, notwithstanding the extensive and painstaking
research underlying NICE recommendations, the beneﬁts pack-
age offered by the English NHS “is arrived at implicitly, as a result
of decisions made by national, regional and local decision
makers, working within a context of laws, duties, policies,
budgets and ﬁnancial incentives that change over time” [37].
Even though there is an apparent policy desire, through the
creation and development of NICE, to create a consistently and
comprehensively speciﬁed HBP, in practice the English NHS does
not have an explicitly speciﬁed basket of treatments. This is
readily observed through the wide geographical variations in
both the availability of and eligibility criteria for many services.
Conclusions
Rumbold et al. [37] summarize the institutions that shape the
NHS beneﬁts package, and identify six broad inﬂuences:
1. Legal and quasi-legal duties. These are generally vague in
content, although the NHS Constitution and requirements to
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adhere to NICE technology appraisals offer exceptions to this
general rule.
2. NICE. Increasingly the guidelines and performance metrics
being developed by NICE are becoming de facto statements of
preferred services, and are extending much beyond the
original territory of new technologies.
3. Government policy. The NHS is a heavily centrally planned
organization in which a multitude of service requirements,
guidance, and performance metrics are applied, intended to
inﬂuence the nature of local service delivery.
4. National commissioning. Many specialized services and much of
primary care are commissioned by the national leadership
body, NHS England.
5. Local commissioning. Local CCGs have considerable freedom to
apply their own interpretation to national guidance, in the
light of local medical needs, service infrastructure, and budget
constraints.
6. Local clinical decisions. As in all health systems, a great deal of
NHS resource allocation arises for the decisions made by
clinicians in their face-to-face contact with patients.
Thus, many of the decisions made at more local levels are
likely to be inﬂuenced (but not determined) by the guidance and
requirements put forward by other levels of the system. In
practice, this mixture of inﬂuences leads to considerable varia-
tion in the HBP made available to identical patients using differ-
ent providers or living in different parts of England. As we have
discussed, these variations may to some extent be efﬁcient, and
may also be a necessary requirement to secure strict expenditure
control within the system. They, however, lead to the ﬁrm
conclusion that the NHS does not have an explicit HBP. Rather,
it has a ﬂexible package, informed by overriding principles, such
as equal access and cost-effectiveness, but permitting consider-
able local ﬂexibility for both commissioners and clinicians.
In the “Introduction” we listed seven beneﬁts of setting an
explicit HBP. Several policy problems in the NHS can therefore be
attributed, at least in part, to the absence of an explicit HBP. Some
of the speciﬁc problems are as follows:
1. Explicit entitlements. There are few ﬁrm entitlements to treat-
ment for patients, and access to many services relies on the
variable policies of local commissioners and practitioners.
2. Spending funds wisely. It is very difﬁcult to determine whether
commissioners are spending their funds in a way that max-
imizes health beneﬁts for society.
3. Resource allocation decisions. NICE is making an increasingly
important contribution to the improvement of allocative
efﬁciency in the NHS at the level of individual treatments.
Nevertheless, geographical resource allocation decisions are
hampered by a lack of an explicit statement of the services to
be provided.
4. Adherence to budget limits. Budget discipline is strong by
international standards. It is, however, achieved by various
somewhat arbitrary means, and the lack of an HBP has led to a
“postcode” lottery of access to some services.
5. Informal payments. With a few exceptions, providers do not
require either formal or informal payments from patients in
the NHS. Nevertheless, local limitations to access for some
services may encourage patients to seek private care, where
they can afford it, which must be funded from voluntary
private insurance or out-of-pocket.
6. Poor and marginalized groups. There is considerable evidence
that poor access to services is greatest among disadvantaged
social groups, a problem that an explicit HBP may help to
address [38].
7. Complementary health insurance. There is no signiﬁcant market
in complementary health insurance for services not covered
by the NHS. Instead, there is a small but signiﬁcant market for
duplicate private insurance, which seeks to bypass services
provided by the NHS through lower waiting times and
enhanced convenience. This market has the potential to
undermine support for the NHS if it attracts larger numbers
of richer people.
Nevertheless, rather than suggesting an absence of an HBP,
the English example more accurately highlights variations in the
“hardness” of the HBP speciﬁcation. At one extreme, NICE
technology appraisals rule in (or rule out) speciﬁc technologies
in their entirety (albeit sometimes possibly limited to certain
patient subgroups) without reference to local provider circum-
stances. At the other extreme, a mass of clinical guidelines offers
clinical recommendations based on existing evidence, but offer
no direct incentives to comply. At an intermediate level, there are
clinical practices that are embodied in performance measures
that suggest good practice, and that may indirectly therefore
affect provider reputation and revenue. They, however, do not
directly contain statements of patient entitlements, and NHS
decision makers may need to balance the need to comply with
performance metrics against the budgetary limits that have
been set.
These variations in explicitness of the HBP may, to a large
extent, reﬂect limitations in the evidence on the effectiveness
and appropriateness of certain treatments. Such limitations
suggest that there may be a need to adopt a nuanced approach
to setting an explicit HBP. At one extreme, when the quality of
information about the costs and beneﬁts of a treatment is good,
and there is little heterogeneity in patient needs and preferences,
it may be possible to make very clear statements about entitle-
ments. For many treatments, where there is less reliable infor-
mation, it may be necessary to allow “exceptions” from usual
practice, which require an explicit statement or request from the
clinician. Furthermore, theory suggests that treatments for which
evidence is weak should be subject to a more demanding cost-
effectiveness threshold [39]. Of course, whatever degree of hard-
ness is adopted in an HBP speciﬁcation, it will always be
important to have an accurate assessment of its likely budgetary
impact.
It is noteworthy that many recent initiatives in England are
seeking to impose greater uniformity through guidelines, per-
formance measures, and payment mechanisms. At the same
time, there have been some moves toward increased local
autonomy, for example, in the devolution of responsibilities
and funding to certain cities such as Manchester. These appa-
rently conﬂicting developments reﬂect the continuing tension
between uniformity and local ﬂexibility found in most health
systems. Yet it is important to note that there are efforts to deﬁne
health packages, often in the form of “essential” levels of
services, even in decentralized health systems such as those
found in Italy, Finland, and Sweden. There is a need for a clearly
speciﬁed national HBP so that local decision makers can be held
properly to account for their choices.
Thus, the fact that there is no formal HBP in England should
not be interpreted as a suggestion that seeking to create such a
package is infeasible or undesirable. Many of the policy problems
confronted by NHS policymakers would to some extent be eased
by the creation of a more explicit HBP. There are, however, many
practical and political constraints to pursuing greater clarity, and
there will always be a need to retain some ﬂexibility in the
services made available. Perhaps the biggest challenge to creating
an explicit HBP is the concern that it would create unaffordable
entitlements to care, and conﬂict with the local ﬂexibility needed
to adhere to budgets. This concern, however, may arise more
from the unaffordable contents of the package rather than from
the principle of setting out entitlements clearly.
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As health systems seek to make a transition toward UHC, they
must confront the issue of whether and how to establish an
explicit beneﬁts package, which sets out the treatments and
services to which beneﬁciaries can secure access. Arrangements
must also be put in place to ensure adequate quality of the
services contained in the package. English policymakers have
traditionally shied away from explicit speciﬁcation of an HBP for
various reasons. There are, nevertheless, signs that they may be
moving toward an “intelligent” HBP, speciﬁed through instru-
ments such as the NICE essential medicines list, broader treat-
ment guidelines, performance measures, and payment
mechanisms. The key challenge is to maintain an appropriate
balance between clarity (when the evidence warrants) and
ﬂexibility (when it does not). Although there are important
reasons why setting out an explicit HBP may be technically,
administratively, and politically difﬁcult, we suggest that, on the
basis of the English experience, the difﬁculties that arise from
failing to set out the HBP far outweigh any advantages, and that
health systems should consider moving toward an explicitly
speciﬁed HBP as an essential element of their UHC plans.
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